perm filename CHAP3[4,KMC]7 blob
sn#049374 filedate 1973-06-15 generic text, type T, neo UTF8
00100 .SEC A SYMBOL-PROCESSING THEORY OF THE PARANOID MODE
00200
00300
00400 .SS Generalizations
00500
00600 A theory involves a conjunction of lawlike generalizations,
00700 hypotheses and auxiliary assumptions. The theory to be described
00800 postulates a structure or organization of interacting symbolic
00900 procedures. These procedures and their interactions are supplemented
01000 in the theory by a number of auxiliary assumptions and
01100 presuppositions which will become apparent as the story unfolds.
01200
01300
01400 I shall first presuppose a schema of intentionalistic action
01500 and non-action which takes the form of a practical inference:
01600 AN AGENT A WANTS SITUATION S TO OBTAIN
01700 A BELIEVES THAT IN ORDER FOR S TO OBTAIN, A MUST DO X
01800 THEREFORE A PLANS, TRIES OR PROCEEDS TO DO X
01900 .END
02000 An agent is taken here to be any intentionalistic system, person ,
02100 procedure or strategy. To do means to produce, prevent or allow
02200 something to happen. We presuppose the agent's power to do X. X can
02300 be multiple sequential or concurrent actions and includes mental
02400 action (e.g. deciding) as well as physical action(e.g.talking). It
02500 is also presupposed in this action-schema that , in doing X, A
02600 receives feedback as to whether S is coming about, i.e. whether
02700 doing X is successful or not in obtaining S.
02800
02900 It is established clinical knowledge that the phenomena of
03000 the paranoid mode can be found associated with a variety of physical
03100 disorders. For example, paranoid thinking can be found in patients
03200 with head injuries, hyperthyroidism hypothyroidism, uremia,
03300 pernicious anemia, cerebral arteriosclerosis, congestive heart
03400 failure, malaria and epilepsy. Also drug intoxications due to
03500 alcohol, amphetamines, marihuana and LSD can be accompanied by the
03600 paranoid mode. Thus the paranoid mode is not a disease but a way of
03700 processing information, a resource, which accompanies underlying
03800 disorders. To account for the association of paranoid thought with
03900 these physical states of illness, a psychological theorist might be
04000 tempted to hypothesize that an intentionalistic cognitive system
04100 would attempt to explain a physical illness state by constructing
04200 persecutory beliefs blaming other human agents for causing the
04300 ill-being of the disease state. But before making such an explanatory
04400 move, we must consider the elusive distinction between reasons and
04500 causes in explanations of human behavior.
04600
04700 When human action is to be explained, confusion easily arises
04800 between appealing to reasons and appealing to causes, as has been
04900 discussed in detail by Toulmin (1971). One view of the association of
05000 the paranoid mode with physical disorders might be that the physical
05100 illness simply causes the paranoia ,through some unknown mechanism,
05200 at a "hardware" level beyond the influence of the procedures of
05300 mental processes and beyond voluntary self-control. That is, the
05400 resultant paranoid process represents something that happens to a
05500 person as victim, not something that he does as an active agent.
05600 Another view is that the paranoid mode can be explained in terms of
05700 reasons, justifications which describe an agent's intentions and
05800 beliefs. Does a person as an agent recognize, monitor and control
05900 what he is doing or trying to do? Or does it just happen to him
06000 automatically without conscious deliberation? This question raises a
06100 third view, namely that unrecognized reasons, aspects of the program
06200 which are sealed off and inacessible to voluntary control, can
06300 function like causes. Once brought to consciousness such reasons can
06400 be modified voluntarily by the agent, as a language user, reflexively
06500 talking to and instructing himself. This second-order monitoring and
06600 control through language contrasts with an agent's inability to
06700 modify causes which lie beyond the influence of self-criticism and
06800 change through internal linguistically mediated argumentation.
06900 Timeworn conundrums about concepts of free-will, determinism,
07000 responsibility, consciousness and the powers of mental action here
07100 plague us unless we stick closely to a computer analogy which makes a
07200 clear and useful distinction between hardware, interpreter and
07300 programs.
07400
07500 Each of these three views provides a serviceable perspective
07600 depending on how a disorder is to be explained and corrected. When
07700 paranoid processes occur during amphetamine intoxication they might
07800 be viewed as biochemically caused and beyond the patient's ability to
07900 control volitionally through internal self-correcting dialogues with
08000 himself. When a paranoid moment occurs in a normal person it can be
08100 viewed as having a reason or justification. If the paranoid belief
08200 is recognized as such, a person has the power to revise or reject it
08300 through internal debate. Between these extremes of drug-induced
08400 paranoid processes and the self-correctible paranoid moments of the
08500 normal person, lie cases of paranoid personalities, paranoid
08600 reactions and the paranoid mode associated with the major psychoses
08700 (schizophrenic and manic-depressive). One opinion has it that the
08800 major psychoses are a consequence of unknown "hardware" causes and
08900 are beyond deliberate voluntary control. But what are we to
09000 conclude about paranoid personalities and paranoid reactions where no
09100 hardware disorder is detectable or suspected? Are such persons to be
09200 considered patients to whom something is mechanically happening or
09300 are they agents whose behavior is a consequence of what they do? Or
09400 are they both agent and patient depending on on how one views the
09500 self-modifiability of their symbolic processing? In these enigmatic
09600 cases we shall take the position that in normal, neurotic and
09700 psychotic paranoid processes (independent of the major psychoses) the
09800 paranoid mode represents something that happens to a man as a
09900 consequence of what he has undergone,of something he now does and
10000 something he now undergoes. Thus he is both agent and victim whose
10100 mental processes have powers to do and liabilities to undergo. His
10200 liabilities are reflexive in that he is victim to and can succumb to,
10300 his own symbolic structures.
10400
10500 From this standpoint I would postulate a duality between
10600 reasons and causes. That is, just as in an algorithm a procedure can
10700 serve as an input argument to another procedure, a reason can
10800 function as a cause in one context and as a justification in another.
10900 When a final cause, such as a consciously conceptualized intention,
11000 guides efficient causes we can say that human action is
11100 non-determinate since it is self-determinate. Thus the power to make
11200 some decisions freely and to change one's mind is non-illusory. When
11300 a reason is recognized to function as a cause and is accessible to
11400 self-monitoring, it may be changed by another procedure which takes
11500 it as an argument. In this sense a two-levelled system involving an
11600 interpreter and its programs is self- changeable and self-correcting,
11700 within limits.
11800
11900 The major processes here postulated to govern the paranoid
12000 mode involve an organization of symbol-processing procedures at one
12100 level governed by an interpreter at another level. I shall sketch
12200 the operations of this organization informally.
12300 (1) The interpreter executes a `consciencing' procedure which
12400 judges an action, desire or state of the self to be wrong or
12500 defective according to criteria of sanctioning beliefs. A censuring
12600 process then attempts to assign blame to an agent for the wrong.
12700 (2)The interpreter attempts a simulation of assigning blame
12800 to the self. If the self accepts blame, the trial simulation detects
12900 an affect-signal of shame warning of an eventual undergoing of
13000 humiliation for personal failure or imperfection. The detection in
13100 the simulation serves as an anticipatory warning not to actually
13200 execute this procedure since it will result in the painful
13300 re-experiencing of a negative affect-state of humiliation.
13400 (3) An alternative procedure of assigning blame to others is
13500 next simulated and found not to eventuate in a painful affect-state.
13600 Hence it is executed. It operates to repudiate that the self is to
13700 blame for a wrong and to ascribe blame to other human agents. Now it
13800 is not the self who is responsible for a wrong but it is that the
13900 self is wronged by others. These strategies are inefficient and only
14000 partially effective as an escape since the outward conduct generated
14100 result in the self repeatedly undergoing criticisms and condemnations
14200 from others which can lead to shame and humiliation. The locus of the
14300 Hostile, antagonistic and belittling behavior provokes and alienates
14400 others. The locus of censure is shifted from the self to others but
14500 the intended actions designed to contend with others have paradoxical
14600 repercussions which result in what the self is internally trying to
14700 avoid.
14800
14900 (4) Since others are now believed to have intentions to wrong
15000 the self, procedures for the detection of malevolence in the input
15100 from others, as individuals or as part of a conspiracy, achieve a
15200 first priority.
15300
15400
15500 (5) If the input procedures succeed in detecting malevolence,
15600 output strategies are executed in an attempt to reduce the other's
15700 malevolent effects on the self.
15800 (6) An evaluation is made regarding the success or
15900 failure of the output procedures.
16000 (7) If benevolence is detected in the input, an attempt is made
16100 to tell one's story seeking self-affirmation and self-
16200 vindication from the other.
16300 (8) If the input is deemed neutral, a neutral nonparanoid
16400 response is given.
16500 The above description attempts to summarize informally in loose
16600 prose a complex series of postulated operations in an organization of
16700 symbol-processing procedures. The details of these procedures and
16800 their interactions will be made explicit when the algorithm is
16900 described (see p ).
17000 The theory is circumscribed in that it attempts to explain
17100 only certain phenomena of a particular type of episode.It does not
17200 attempt to explain, for example, why the censuring process condemns
17300 particular actions or states as wrongs nor how any of these
17400 procedures develop over time in a person's paranoidogenic
17500 socialization experience. Thus it does not provide an ontogenetic
17600 explanation of how an organization of processes evolved and grew to
17700 be the way it is. The model offers an explanation only of how the
17800 organization operates in the ethogenesis of conduct and character
17900 occuring in the present.
18000 Some evidence bearing on the postulated processes will now be
18100 discussed. The processes of (5),which attempt to cope with a
18200 malevolent other, receive evidential support from observations of
18300 normal, neurotic and psychotic paranoias. The agent may report his
18400 self-monitoring directly to an observer commenting that his, for
18500 example, hostile remarks are intended to retaliate for a believed
18600 wrong at the hands of the other. ("I want him to feel bad and to
18700 leave me alone".) The output actions of the paranoid mode can be
18800 grouped into reducing persecution by retribution or by withdrawal.
18900 Retribution is intended to drive the other away while withdrawal
19000 removes the self from the sphere of the other. We are not aware of
19100 any experimental evidence bearing on this point. Perhaps the clinical
19200 and everyday observations are sufficient enough not to require any.
19300 The intensive scan for malevolence postulated in (3) has both
19400 clinical and experimental evidence in its behalf. Clinicians are
19500 familiar with the darting eye-movements of psychotic paranoids.
19600 Patients themselves report their hypervigilance as intended to detect
19700 signs of malevolence. Silverman [ ] and Venables [ ] have reported
19800 experiments indicating that paranoid schizophrenics more extensively
19900 scan their visual fields and have a greater breadth of attention than
20000 other schizophrenic patients.
20100 In considering the processes postulated in (2) and (1),
20200 direct evidence is hard to come by and thus the postulates are on
20300 shakier ground. Since antiquity it has been a common observation that
20400 paranoids tend to accuse others of actions and states which hold true
20500 for themselves according an outside observer. As Newton, in a classic
20600 paranoid clash, said about Leibniz 300 years ago: "he himself is
20700 guilty of what he complains of in others"[ Manuel]. A process of
20800 ascription has also been offered to account for the particular
20900 selectivity involved in the hypersensitivity to criticism. That is,
21000 why does a man believe others will ridicule him about his appearance
21100 unless some part of himself believes his appearance to be defective.
21200 An alternative view is that the selectivity stems from an agent,
21300 uncertain of himself and observing how others in his community are
21400 censured and ridiculed, expects the same to be applied to him.
21500 The obscurity of the relation between what the self expects
21600 as malevolence and the self's own properties is well illustrated in
21700 hypotheses which have attempted to explain the paranoid mode as a
21800 consequence of homosexual conflict. It has long been observed that
21900 some (not all) paranoid patients are excessively concerned with the
22000 topic of homosexuality. Several studies of hospitalized paranoid
22100 schizophrenics show them to be preoccupied with homosexuality far
22200 more than the nonpsychotic controls.(See Klaf and Davis [ ],etc) Such
22300 evidence may be interpreted as having generative implications for
22400 certain cases. As a special case in a more general theory of avoiding
22500 humiliation, if homosexual interests are evaluated by the censuring
22600 process as wrong, then the ethogenesis of the paranoid mode on these
22700 grounds becomes plausible. There is also a nonnegligible probability
22800 that an agent, doubtful of his own sexuality, might expect to be
22900 accused of homosexuality in a community which censures homosexuality.
23000 In such a community homosexuals trying to "pass" are of necessity
23100 suspicious and a bit paranoid since like the spy in hostile
23200 territory, they must be on guard against stigmatizing detection.
23300 It is obvious that self-censuring processes contribute to the
23400 regulation of human conduct. But are distortions of self-censuring
23500 and blaming processes "really" the ethogenic core of the paranoid
23600 mode? Heilbrun and Norbert have shown that paranoid schizophrenics
23700 are more sensitive to maternal censure as measured by the disruption
23800 of a cognitive task by a tape-recording of a mother censuring her
23900 son. [ ] (Give anecdotal examples? Spassky-Fischer, Hofstader,
24000 Fowles, Corvo)
24100 .SS Initial Conditions
24200 When a theory is embodied in a concrete operating model,
24300 representations of lawlike generalizations are combined with
24400 representations of singular conditions, usually termed "initial
24500 conditions". In constructing a simulation one can attempt to
24600 reproduce the behavior of an actual individual who is a member of
24700 some well-defined class. Another approach, which we adopted, is to
24800 construct a hypothetical individual whose behavior will cause him to
24900 be placed in a certain class, in this case the class "paranoid". The
25000 singular statements describing our hypothetical individual follow.
25100 He is a 28 year old single Protestant male who works as a
25200 stockclerk at Sears, a large department store. He has no siblings and
25300 lives alone, seldom seeing his parents. He is sensitive about his
25400 parents, his religion and about sex. His hobby is gambling on
25500 horseracing, both at tracks and through bookies. A few months ago he
25600 became involved in a severe quarrel with a bookie, claiming the
25700 bookie did not pay off a bet. After the quarrel it occurred to him
25800 that bookies pay protection to the underworld and that this bookie
25900 might gain revenge by having him injured or killed by the Mafia. He
26000 is eager to tell his story and to get help in protecting him from the
26100 underworld. He is willing to answer questions about non- sensitive
26200 areas of his life and offers hints about his delusional system in an
26300 attempt to feel out the interviewer's attitude towards him.
26400 .SS The Nature of Algorithms
26500
26600 Theories can be presented in various forms such as essays,
26700 mathematical equations and computer programs. To date most
26800 theoretical explanations in psychiatry and psychology have consisted
26900 of natural language essays with all their well-known vagueness and
27000 ambiguities.Many of these formulations have been untestable, not
27100 because relevant observations were lacking but because it was unclear
27200 what the essay was really saying. Clarity is needed.
27300 An alternative way of formulating psychological theories is now
27400 available in the form of ethogenic algorithms, computer programs,
27500 which have the virtue of being clear and explicit in their
27600 articulation and which can be run on a computer to test internal
27700 consistency and external correspondence with the data of observation.
27800 Since we do not know the `real' mind-brain algorithms, we construct a
27900 theoretical model which represents a partial paramorphic analogue.
28000 (See Harre, 1972). The analogy is at the symbol- processing level,
28100 not at the hardware level. A functional, computational or procedural
28200 equivalence is being postulated. The question then becomes one of
28300 determining the degree of the equivalence. Weak functional
28400 equivalence consists of indistinguishability at the outermost
28500 input-output level. Strong equivalence means correspondence at each
28600 inner I/O level, that is there exists a match not only between what
28700 is being done but how it is being done at a given level of
28800 operations.(These points will be discussed in greater detail in
28900 Chapter 3).
29000 An algorithm represents an organization of symbol-processing
29100 mechanisms or functions which represent an `effective procedure'. It
29200 is essential to grasp this fundamental concept of computer science.
29300 An effective procedure consists of two ingredients:
29400 .V
29500 (1) A programming language in which procedural rules of
29600 behavior can be rigorously and unambiguously specified.
29700
29800 (2) A machine processor which can rapidly and reliably carry
29900 out the processes specified by the procedural rules.
30000 .END
30100 The specifications of (1), written in a formally defined programming
30200 language, is termed an algorithm or program while (2) involves a
30300 computer as the machine processor, a set of deterministic physical
30400 mechanisms which can perform the operations specified in the
30500 algorithm. The algorithm is called `effective' because it actually
30600 works, performing as intended when run on the machine processor.
30700 It is worth remphasis that a simulation model postulates procedures
30800 analogous to the real and unknown procedures. The analogy being drawn
30900 here is between specified processes and their generating systems.
31000 Thus
31100
31200 .V
31300 mental process computational process
31400 --------------:: ----------------------
31500 brain hardware computer hardware and
31600 and programs programs
31700 .END
31800
31900 The analogy is not simply between computer hardware and brain
32000 wetware. We are not comparing the structure of neurons with the
32100 structure of transisitors; we are comparing the organization of
32200 symbol-processing procedures in an algorithm with symbol-processing
32300 procedures of the mind-brain. The central nervous system contains a
32400 representation of the experience of its holder. A model builder has a
32500 conceptual representation of that representation which he
32600 demonstrates in the form of an algorithm. Thus an algorithm is a
32700 demonstration of a representation of a representation.
32800 When an algorithm runs on a computer the postulated explanatory
32900 structure becomes actualized, not described. (To describe the model
33000 is to present , among other things, its embodied theory). A
33100 simulation model such as the one presented here can be interacted
33200 with by a person at the linguistic level as a communicating agent in
33300 the world. Its symbolic communicative behavior can be experienced in
33400 a concrete form by a human observer-actor. Thus it can be known by
33500 acquaintance, by first-hand knowledge, as well as by the second-hand
33600 knowledge of description.
33600 Since the algoritm is written in a programming language, it
33700 is hermetic and opaque except to a few people, who in general do not
33800 enjoy reading other people's code. Hence the intelligibility and
33900 scrutability requirement for explanations must be met in other ways.
34000 In an attempt to open the model to scrutiny I shall describe the
34100 model in detail using diagrams and interview examples profusely.