perm filename CHAP3[4,KMC]7 blob sn#049374 filedate 1973-06-15 generic text, type T, neo UTF8
00100	.SEC A SYMBOL-PROCESSING THEORY OF THE PARANOID MODE
00200	
00300	           
00400	.SS Generalizations
00500	
00600		A  theory  involves a conjunction of lawlike generalizations,
00700	hypotheses and auxiliary assumptions.  The  theory  to  be  described
00800	postulates  a  structure  or  organization  of  interacting  symbolic
00900	procedures. These procedures and their interactions are  supplemented
01000	in   the   theory   by   a   number   of  auxiliary  assumptions  and
01100	presuppositions which will become apparent as the story unfolds.
01200	
01300	
01400		I  shall first presuppose a schema of intentionalistic action
01500	and non-action which takes the form of a practical inference:
01600		AN AGENT A WANTS SITUATION S TO OBTAIN
01700		A BELIEVES THAT IN ORDER FOR S TO OBTAIN, A MUST DO X
01800		THEREFORE A PLANS, TRIES OR PROCEEDS TO DO X
01900	.END
02000	An  agent  is  taken here to be any intentionalistic system, person ,
02100	procedure or strategy.  To do means  to  produce,  prevent  or  allow
02200	something  to  happen. We presuppose the agent's power to do X. X can
02300	be multiple sequential or  concurrent  actions  and  includes  mental
02400	action  (e.g.   deciding) as well as physical action(e.g.talking). It
02500	is also presupposed in this  action-schema  that  ,  in  doing  X,  A
02600	receives  feedback  as  to whether S is coming about, i.e.    whether
02700	doing X is successful or not in obtaining S.
02800	
02900		It  is  established  clinical knowledge that the phenomena of
03000	the paranoid mode can be found associated with a variety of  physical
03100	disorders.   For  example, paranoid thinking can be found in patients
03200	with   head   injuries,   hyperthyroidism   hypothyroidism,   uremia,
03300	pernicious   anemia,   cerebral  arteriosclerosis,  congestive  heart
03400	failure, malaria and epilepsy.      Also drug  intoxications  due  to
03500	alcohol,  amphetamines,  marihuana  and LSD can be accompanied by the
03600	paranoid mode. Thus the paranoid mode is not a disease but a  way  of
03700	processing  information,  a  resource,  which  accompanies underlying
03800	disorders. To account for the association of  paranoid  thought  with
03900	these  physical  states of illness, a psychological theorist might be
04000	tempted to hypothesize  that  an  intentionalistic  cognitive  system
04100	would  attempt  to  explain  a physical illness state by constructing
04200	persecutory beliefs  blaming  other  human  agents  for  causing  the
04300	ill-being of the disease state. But before making such an explanatory
04400	move, we must consider the elusive distinction  between  reasons  and
04500	causes in explanations of human behavior.
04600	
04700		When human action is to be explained, confusion easily arises
04800	between  appealing  to  reasons  and appealing to causes, as has been
04900	discussed in detail by Toulmin (1971). One view of the association of
05000	the  paranoid mode with physical disorders might be that the physical
05100	illness simply causes the paranoia ,through some  unknown  mechanism,
05200	at  a  "hardware"  level  beyond  the  influence of the procedures of
05300	mental processes and beyond  voluntary  self-control.  That  is,  the
05400	resultant  paranoid  process  represents  something that happens to a
05500	person as victim, not something that he  does  as  an  active  agent.
05600	Another  view  is that the paranoid mode can be explained in terms of
05700	reasons, justifications which  describe  an  agent's  intentions  and
05800	beliefs.   Does  a  person as an agent recognize, monitor and control
05900	what he is doing or trying to do? Or  does  it  just  happen  to  him
06000	automatically  without conscious deliberation? This question raises a
06100	third view, namely that unrecognized reasons, aspects of the  program
06200	which  are  sealed  off  and  inacessible  to  voluntary control, can
06300	function like causes.  Once brought to consciousness such reasons can
06400	be modified voluntarily by the agent, as a language user, reflexively
06500	talking to and instructing himself. This second-order monitoring  and
06600	control  through  language  contrasts  with  an  agent's inability to
06700	modify causes which lie beyond the influence  of  self-criticism  and
06800	change   through   internal  linguistically  mediated  argumentation.
06900	Timeworn  conundrums  about  concepts  of   free-will,   determinism,
07000	responsibility,  consciousness  and  the powers of mental action here
07100	plague us unless we stick closely to a computer analogy which makes a
07200	clear  and  useful  distinction  between  hardware,  interpreter  and
07300	programs.
07400	
07500		Each of these three views provides a serviceable  perspective
07600	depending  on how a disorder is to be explained and corrected.   When
07700	paranoid processes occur during amphetamine intoxication  they  might
07800	be viewed as biochemically caused and beyond the patient's ability to
07900	control volitionally through internal self-correcting dialogues  with
08000	himself.  When  a paranoid moment occurs in a normal person it can be
08100	viewed as having a reason or justification.  If the  paranoid  belief
08200	is  recognized as such, a person has the power to revise or reject it
08300	through internal  debate.  Between  these  extremes  of  drug-induced
08400	paranoid  processes  and the self-correctible paranoid moments of the
08500	normal  person,  lie  cases  of  paranoid   personalities,   paranoid
08600	reactions  and  the paranoid mode associated with the major psychoses
08700	(schizophrenic and manic-depressive).   One opinion has it  that  the
08800	major  psychoses  are  a consequence of unknown "hardware" causes and
08900	are beyond deliberate  voluntary  control.     But  what  are  we  to
09000	conclude about paranoid personalities and paranoid reactions where no
09100	hardware disorder is detectable or suspected?  Are such persons to be
09200	considered  patients  to  whom something is mechanically happening or
09300	are they agents whose behavior is a consequence of what they do?   Or
09400	are  they  both  agent  and patient depending on on how one views the
09500	self-modifiability of their symbolic processing?  In these  enigmatic
09600	cases  we  shall  take  the  position  that  in  normal, neurotic and
09700	psychotic paranoid processes (independent of the major psychoses) the
09800	paranoid  mode  represents  something  that  happens  to  a  man as a
09900	consequence of what he has undergone,of something  he  now  does  and
10000	something  he now undergoes.  Thus he is both agent and victim whose
10100	mental processes have powers to do and liabilities  to  undergo.  His
10200	liabilities are reflexive in that he is victim to and can succumb to,
10300	his own symbolic structures.
10400	
10500		From  this  standpoint  I  would  postulate a duality between
10600	reasons and causes. That is, just as in an algorithm a procedure  can
10700	serve  as  an  input  argument  to  another  procedure,  a reason can
10800	function as a cause in one context and as a justification in another.
10900	When  a  final cause, such as a consciously conceptualized intention,
11000	guides  efficient  causes  we  can   say   that   human   action   is
11100	non-determinate  since it is self-determinate. Thus the power to make
11200	some decisions freely and to change one's mind is non-illusory.  When
11300	a  reason  is  recognized to function as a cause and is accessible to
11400	self-monitoring, it may be changed by another procedure  which  takes
11500	it  as  an argument. In this sense a two-levelled system involving an
11600	interpreter and its programs is self- changeable and self-correcting,
11700	within limits.
11800	
11900		The major processes here postulated to  govern  the  paranoid
12000	mode  involve  an organization of symbol-processing procedures at one
12100	level governed by an interpreter at another level.  I  shall  sketch
12200	the operations of this organization informally.
12300		(1) The interpreter executes a `consciencing' procedure which
12400	judges  an  action,  desire  or  state  of  the  self  to be wrong or
12500	defective according to criteria of sanctioning beliefs.  A  censuring
12600	process then attempts to assign blame to an agent for the wrong.
12700		(2)The  interpreter  attempts a simulation of assigning blame
12800	to the self.  If the self accepts blame, the trial simulation detects
12900	an  affect-signal  of  shame  warning  of  an  eventual undergoing of
13000	humiliation for personal failure or imperfection.  The  detection  in
13100	the  simulation  serves  as  an  anticipatory warning not to actually
13200	execute  this  procedure  since  it  will  result  in   the   painful
13300	re-experiencing of a negative affect-state of humiliation.
13400		(3) An alternative procedure of assigning blame to others  is
13500	next  simulated and found not to eventuate in a painful affect-state.
13600	Hence it is executed. It operates to repudiate that the  self  is  to
13700	blame  for a wrong and to ascribe blame to other human agents. Now it
13800	is not the self who is responsible for a wrong but  it  is  that  the
13900	self is wronged by others.  These strategies are inefficient and only
14000	partially effective as an escape since the outward conduct  generated
14100	result in the self repeatedly undergoing criticisms and condemnations
14200	from others which can lead to shame and humiliation. The locus of the
14300	Hostile,  antagonistic and belittling behavior provokes and alienates
14400	others. The locus of censure is shifted from the self to  others  but
14500	the intended actions designed to contend with others have paradoxical
14600	repercussions which result in what the self is internally  trying  to
14700	avoid.
14800	
14900		(4) Since others are now believed to have intentions to  wrong
15000	the  self,  procedures  for the detection of malevolence in the input
15100	from others, as individuals or as part of  a  conspiracy,  achieve  a
15200	first priority.
15300	
15400	
15500		(5) If the input procedures succeed in detecting malevolence,
15600	output strategies are executed in an attempt to  reduce  the  other's
15700	malevolent effects on the self.
15800		(6) An evaluation is made regarding  the  success  or
15900	failure of the output procedures.
16000		(7) If benevolence is detected in the input, an attempt is made
16100		    to tell one's story seeking self-affirmation and self-
16200		    vindication from the other.
16300		(8) If the input is deemed neutral, a neutral nonparanoid  
16400		    response is given.
16500		The above description attempts to summarize informally in loose
16600	prose a complex series of postulated operations in an organization of
16700	symbol-processing procedures.    The details of these procedures  and
16800	their  interactions  will  be  made  explicit  when  the algorithm is
16900	described (see p ).
17000		The theory is circumscribed in that it  attempts  to  explain
17100	only  certain  phenomena  of a particular type of episode.It does not
17200	attempt to explain, for example, why the censuring  process  condemns
17300	particular  actions  or  states  as  wrongs  nor  how  any  of  these
17400	procedures  develop  over   time   in   a   person's   paranoidogenic
17500	socialization  experience.    Thus it does not provide an ontogenetic
17600	explanation of how an organization of processes evolved and  grew  to
17700	be  the  way  it is.  The model offers an explanation only of how the
17800	organization operates in the ethogenesis  of  conduct  and  character
17900	occuring in the present.
18000		Some evidence bearing on the postulated processes will now be
18100	discussed.   The  processes  of  (5),which  attempt  to  cope  with a
18200	malevolent other, receive evidential  support  from  observations  of
18300	normal,  neurotic  and psychotic paranoias.  The agent may report his
18400	self-monitoring directly to an  observer  commenting  that  his,  for
18500	example,  hostile  remarks  are  intended to retaliate for a believed
18600	wrong at the hands of the other. ("I want him  to  feel  bad  and  to
18700	leave  me  alone".)  The  output  actions of the paranoid mode can be
18800	grouped into reducing persecution by retribution  or  by  withdrawal.
18900	Retribution  is  intended  to  drive  the other away while withdrawal
19000	removes the self from the sphere of the other. We are  not  aware  of
19100	any experimental evidence bearing on this point. Perhaps the clinical
19200	and everyday observations are sufficient enough not to require any.
19300		The intensive scan for malevolence postulated in (3) has both
19400	clinical and experimental evidence in its  behalf.    Clinicians  are
19500	familiar  with  the  darting  eye-movements  of  psychotic paranoids.
19600	Patients themselves report their hypervigilance as intended to detect
19700	signs  of  malevolence.  Silverman [ ] and Venables [ ] have reported
19800	experiments indicating that paranoid schizophrenics more  extensively
19900	scan their visual fields and have a greater breadth of attention than
20000	other schizophrenic patients.
20100		In considering the  processes  postulated  in  (2)  and  (1),
20200	direct  evidence  is  hard  to come by and thus the postulates are on
20300	shakier ground. Since antiquity it has been a common observation that
20400	paranoids tend to accuse others of actions and states which hold true
20500	for themselves according an outside observer. As Newton, in a classic
20600	paranoid  clash,  said  about  Leibniz  300 years ago: "he himself is
20700	guilty of what he complains of in others"[  Manuel].   A  process  of
20800	ascription  has  also  been  offered  to  account  for the particular
20900	selectivity involved in the hypersensitivity to criticism.   That is,
21000	why  does a man believe others will ridicule him about his appearance
21100	unless some part of himself believes his appearance to be  defective.
21200	An  alternative  view  is  that  the selectivity stems from an agent,
21300	uncertain of himself and observing how others in  his  community  are
21400	censured and ridiculed, expects the same to be applied to him.
21500		The obscurity of the relation between what the  self  expects
21600	as  malevolence  and the self's own properties is well illustrated in
21700	hypotheses which have attempted to explain the  paranoid  mode  as  a
21800	consequence  of  homosexual  conflict. It has long been observed that
21900	some (not all) paranoid patients are excessively concerned  with  the
22000	topic  of  homosexuality.    Several studies of hospitalized paranoid
22100	schizophrenics show them to be  preoccupied  with  homosexuality  far
22200	more than the nonpsychotic controls.(See Klaf and Davis [ ],etc) Such
22300	evidence may be interpreted as  having  generative  implications  for
22400	certain cases. As a special case in a more general theory of avoiding
22500	humiliation, if homosexual interests are evaluated by  the  censuring
22600	process  as wrong, then the ethogenesis of the paranoid mode on these
22700	grounds becomes plausible. There is also a nonnegligible  probability
22800	that  an  agent,  doubtful  of  his own sexuality, might expect to be
22900	accused of homosexuality in a community which censures homosexuality.
23000	In  such  a  community  homosexuals trying to "pass" are of necessity
23100	suspicious  and  a  bit  paranoid  since  like  the  spy  in  hostile
23200	territory, they must be on guard against stigmatizing detection.
23300		It is obvious that self-censuring processes contribute to the
23400	regulation  of  human  conduct. But are distortions of self-censuring
23500	and blaming processes "really" the ethogenic  core  of  the  paranoid
23600	mode?  Heilbrun  and  Norbert have shown that paranoid schizophrenics
23700	are more sensitive to maternal censure as measured by the  disruption
23800	of  a  cognitive  task  by a tape-recording of a mother censuring her
23900	son.  [  ]  (Give  anecdotal  examples?  Spassky-Fischer,  Hofstader,
24000	Fowles, Corvo)
24100	.SS Initial Conditions
24200		When  a  theory  is  embodied  in a concrete operating model,
24300	representations  of  lawlike  generalizations   are   combined   with
24400	representations  of  singular  conditions,  usually  termed  "initial
24500	conditions".  In  constructing  a  simulation  one  can  attempt   to
24600	reproduce  the  behavior  of  an actual individual who is a member of
24700	some well-defined class. Another approach, which we  adopted,  is  to
24800	construct  a hypothetical individual whose behavior will cause him to
24900	be placed in a certain class, in this case the class "paranoid".  The
25000	singular statements describing our hypothetical individual follow.
25100		He is a 28 year old single Protestant male  who  works  as  a
25200	stockclerk at Sears, a large department store. He has no siblings and
25300	lives alone, seldom seeing his parents. He  is  sensitive  about  his
25400	parents,  his  religion  and  about  sex.  His  hobby  is gambling on
25500	horseracing, both at tracks and through bookies. A few months ago  he
25600	became  involved  in  a  severe  quarrel  with a bookie, claiming the
25700	bookie did not pay off a bet. After the quarrel it  occurred  to  him
25800	that  bookies  pay  protection to the underworld and that this bookie
25900	might gain revenge by having him injured or killed by the  Mafia.  He
26000	is eager to tell his story and to get help in protecting him from the
26100	underworld. He is willing to answer questions  about  non-  sensitive
26200	areas  of his life and offers hints about his delusional system in an
26300	attempt to feel out the interviewer's attitude towards him.
26400	.SS The Nature of Algorithms
26500	
26600		Theories can be presented in various forms  such  as  essays,
26700	mathematical   equations   and   computer   programs.  To  date  most
26800	theoretical explanations in psychiatry and psychology have  consisted
26900	of  natural  language  essays with all their well-known vagueness and
27000	ambiguities.Many of these  formulations  have  been  untestable,  not
27100	because relevant observations were lacking but because it was unclear
27200	what the essay was really saying. Clarity is needed.
27300	An  alternative  way  of  formulating  psychological  theories is now
27400	available in the form of  ethogenic  algorithms,  computer  programs,
27500	which   have  the  virtue  of  being  clear  and  explicit  in  their
27600	articulation and which can be run on  a  computer  to  test  internal
27700	consistency and external correspondence with the data of observation.
27800	Since we do not know the `real' mind-brain algorithms, we construct a
27900	theoretical  model  which  represents a partial paramorphic analogue.
28000	(See Harre, 1972). The analogy is at the  symbol-  processing  level,
28100	not  at the hardware level. A functional, computational or procedural
28200	equivalence is being postulated. The question  then  becomes  one  of
28300	determining   the   degree   of   the  equivalence.  Weak  functional
28400	equivalence  consists  of  indistinguishability  at   the   outermost
28500	input-output  level.  Strong equivalence means correspondence at each
28600	inner I/O level, that is there exists a match not only  between  what
28700	is  being  done  but  how  it  is  being  done  at  a  given level of
28800	operations.(These points will  be  discussed  in  greater  detail  in
28900	Chapter 3).
29000		An algorithm represents an organization of  symbol-processing
29100	mechanisms  or functions which represent an `effective procedure'. It
29200	is essential to grasp this fundamental concept of  computer  science.
29300	An effective procedure consists of two ingredients:
29400	.V
29500		(1) A programming language in which procedural rules of
29600		    behavior can be rigorously and unambiguously specified.
29700	
29800		(2) A machine processor which can rapidly and reliably carry
29900		    out the processes specified by the procedural rules.
30000	.END
30100	The specifications of (1), written in a formally defined  programming
30200	language,  is  termed  an  algorithm  or program while (2) involves a
30300	computer as the machine processor, a set  of  deterministic  physical
30400	mechanisms   which  can  perform  the  operations  specified  in  the
30500	algorithm. The algorithm is called `effective'  because  it  actually
30600	works, performing as intended when run on the machine processor.
30700	It is worth remphasis that a simulation model  postulates  procedures
30800	analogous to the real and unknown procedures. The analogy being drawn
30900	here is between specified processes  and  their  generating  systems.
31000	Thus
31100	
31200	.V
31300	      mental process    computational process
31400	      --------------:: ----------------------
31500	      brain hardware      computer hardware and
31600	      and programs           programs
31700	.END
31800	
31900	The analogy  is  not  simply  between  computer  hardware  and  brain
32000	wetware.  We  are  not  comparing  the  structure of neurons with the
32100	structure of transisitors;  we  are  comparing  the  organization  of
32200	symbol-processing  procedures  in an algorithm with symbol-processing
32300	procedures of the mind-brain. The central nervous system  contains  a
32400	representation of the experience of its holder. A model builder has a
32500	conceptual   representation   of   that   representation   which   he
32600	demonstrates  in  the  form  of  an algorithm. Thus an algorithm is a
32700	demonstration of a representation of a representation.
32800	When  an  algorithm  runs  on  a  computer the postulated explanatory
32900	structure becomes actualized, not described. (To describe  the  model
33000	is  to  present  ,  among  other  things,  its  embodied  theory).  A
33100	simulation model such as the one presented  here  can  be  interacted
33200	with  by a person at the linguistic level as a communicating agent in
33300	the world. Its symbolic communicative behavior can be experienced  in
33400	a  concrete  form  by a human observer-actor. Thus it can be known by
33500	acquaintance, by first-hand knowledge, as well as by the  second-hand
33600	knowledge of description.
33600		Since the algoritm is written in a programming  language,  it
33700	is  hermetic and opaque except to a few people, who in general do not
33800	enjoy reading other people's code.   Hence  the  intelligibility  and
33900	scrutability  requirement for explanations must be met in other ways.
34000	In an attempt to open the model to  scrutiny  I  shall  describe  the
34100	model in detail using diagrams and interview examples profusely.